CIC Occasional Paper No. 9 - Failing Democracy: How the Kazakh Opposition Endangers Reform

April 2005

“The spectre of the ‘orange revolution’ hangs over the region a like a cloud. It seems that Western projects for the gradual liberalization of Central Asian economic systems have failed … ”

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Opposition parties in Kazakhstan were quick to suggest that the recent political upheavals in Georgia and the Ukraine were part of a pattern of events that was likely to sweep rapidly across the Caspian region and the Caucuses. Since then, events in neighbouring Kyrgyzstan appear to lend plausibility to this view. “Who’s next?” asked Herb Meter, an Associated Press correspondent reporting the flight of the Kyrgyzstan President Askar Akayev. ”That is the question strongmen in former Soviet lands are asking themselves nervously after Kyrgyzstan became the third country in the region to be swept by revolution .”

Following the Orange Revolution in December 2004, the leaders of the three main opposition parties in Kazakhstan - Ak-Zhol (Shining Path), the Communist Party of Kazakhstan and the Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan (DCK) - rushed to Kiev to “express solidarity” with Viktor Yuschenko following his famous victory.

The intention to identify publicly with the former plight of pro-democratic and pro-Western political forces in Georgia and the Ukraine was also reflected in a headline in the newspaper Azat, which is the mouthpiece of the DCK, which read: “Georgia Yesterday, Ukraine Today, Kazakhstan Tomorrow?” Any doubts that the DCK may have had about the matter seem to have faded fast: these words continue to appear in DCK slogans - but the question mark has disappeared.

In another attempt to raise the political temperature, Maksat Muratov, a columnist writing in the opposition newspaper Soz, reported that Russia was willing to do anything – including sending in its army - to prevent in Kazakhstan a repetition of events in Georgia and the Ukraine and to ensure that the winner in the Presidential election remained loyal to the Kremlin.

It is too soon to reach a definitive assessment about the events which brought down the Kyrgyz President in late March of this year, but these would appear to underline the obvious lesson that public demonstrations aimed at toppling governments do not necessarily lead to stability. They also demonstrate how dangerously misleading comparisons between political conditions in different Caspian states can be, while those made with states outside the region may have even less relevance. Whatever the political outcome in Kyrgyzstan, neither the opinion polls nor Kazakhstan’s steadily rising prosperity remotely suggest that President Nursultan Nazarbayev will be swept from power, or that he has reason even to contemplate sending an SOS to the Russian army in order to shore up his position. The most recent opinion poll suggests that in the metropolitan areas Nazarbayev will win just over 50 per cent of the popular vote in the presidential elections (which may come as early as December of this year), while only 15 per cent said they would vote for a common Opposition candidate. Of the respondents, 43 per cent expressly ruled out the possibility of a repetition of the events that occurred in the Ukraine; 16 per cent thought such a scenario was likely.

Moreover, while President Nazarbayev has maintained close relations with Moscow, he cannot be regarded as anti-Western in any meaningful sense. In foreign policy he has pursued a ‘multi-vector’ approach that has at its heart the pursuit of good relations with Washington, which in turn has helped underwrite a high level of US investment in the development of the country’s huge energy resources. He has won Western praise for a highly successful macro-economic policy as well as for robust anti-terrorist measures, and his readiness to send a small, but highly symbolic, force to join the Coalition forces in Iraq. (Their presence is not merely symbolic, however: Kazakhstan’s specialist troops have defused more than 3 million anti-personnel mines at the time of writing.) Nevertheless, the Soz columnist quoted above remained determined both to look on the black side and to see parallels between countries with widely divergent political conditions: “The Ukraine was saved from such a fate [Russian military intervention] by the European Union and the USA, but nobody knows who will save us.”

The same political paranoia and the same intemperance were on display at a seminar on political prospects in Eurasia staged in London last November. This was jointly organised by a British think-tank, the Foreign Policy Centre, and the newly created International Freedom Network, run the by Paris-based Kazakhstan film-maker Rashid Nougmanov. The eight members of the Kazakh opposition taking part were unsparing in their criticism of the Government, glossing over the very considerable differences in social and economic conditions in CIS states in order to draw parallels between circumstances in their own country and those in Georgia, where direct action had brought down Eduard Shevardnadze a month earlier.

The keynote speaker was Altynbek Sarsenbayev, co-founder of Ak-Zhol, and a former Minister of Information who claimed that Kazakhstan was tottering “on brink of totalitarianism”. He went on to repeat claims that the recent elections to the Majilis in September 2004 which had resulted in victory for Otan, the party led by President Nursultan Nazarbayev, had been rigged.

To some at least, Mr Sarsenbayev must have appeared an improbable champion of political reform: he is one of those responsible for the early drafts of a much-criticised Media Bill which was vetoed by the Kazakh President in November 2004 after complaints that it would destroy press freedom; he was also sharply criticised by the OSCE for his part in organising the 1995 elections to the Majilis; and in December 2000 he was blamed by the DCK for the closure of a newspaper that had the temerity to criticise his conduct as a minister. However, none of this prevented him from condemning the government for stifling the press, reversing the reform process, squandering the nation’s oil riches and for wilfully neglecting the poor. The fact that his remarks were reported in the Kazakh press confounded at least one of his accusations, but his intended audience was quite clearly the Western media, much of which is poorly informed about Central Asian affairs, rather than those at home.

Since their emergence as genuine parties of opposition in the wake of Soviet collapse, Ak-Zhol, DCK and the Communist Party have been excessively prone to intra-party as well as inter-party squabbles. There is an opera-bouffe quality to their politics which manifests itself in constant faction fighting, the circulation of forged letters, frequent allegations of bad faith and financial irregularity, and smear campaigns. However, in the remarks of Mr Sarsenbayev, and in the aspects of Opposition behaviour described earlier, it is possible to detect common elements. These include the desire to discredit the elections to the Majilis on 19th September 2004 and to denounce the legitimacy of the Kazakh government and the Kazakh president.

A second purpose is to suggest that the country is about to reverse the reform programme. A third is to convey the impression that the interplay of political forces within Kazakhstan can be seen as a contest between a pro-Western, pro-democratic opposition and a pro-Russian and anti-democratic government and President. To that end, the parties’ resources are devoted to winning friends and support among Western NGOs and sections of the Western media.

More generally, there is an attempt to exaggerate the authoritarian tendencies of the government and to misrepresent its actions; for example, there have been at least two occasions when prominent opposition figures have sought Western attention by cancelling foreign speaking engagements after claiming that they were prevented from leaving their country when, on investigation, this turned out not to be the case.

In developing this strategy, the DCK, which won only 3.4 per cent of the popular vote in the September elections, has gone rather further than its partners. It has called for a campaign of civil disobedience - an appeal which has predictably fallen on deaf ears - but which resulted in the party’s liquidation by the Inter-district court in Almaty, on 7th January 2005. The court upheld arguments from the Almaty prosecutor’s office that a statement issued at the party’s congress was unconstitutional. According to the prosecutors, this called “for resolute public actions, including civil disobedience campaigns, and declares the incumbent authorities anti-people and illegitimate.” In the words of the prosecutors, the statement constituted “a manifestation of political extremism, and the instigation of animosity and discord between various social groups of the population.”

Since the party’s liquidation, a letter written by the opposition journalist and activist Gulzhan Ergalieva which was leaked to the media revealed a major split within the DCK following the emergence of a new group and the exclusion of the party’s old guard from its decision-making executive. The most controversial aspect of her letter is the claim that the new leadership is responsible for a new policy which includes steps to deliberately provoke conflict with the government. According to its author, the declaration states that “… upon an instruction from the top, the DCK will switch over to an emergency state and start work on the formation of youth fighting squads which are capable of provoking conflicts with the authorities at any time ... ”

Miss Ergalieva at first denied authorship of the letter, but now admits having written it.

In a country in which democratic traditions go back scarcely more than a decade, inflammatory gestures of that kind are likely to produce a swift response and it is at least possible that the declaration was intended to raise the temperature by goading the government into action.

The problems of the DCK were quickly followed by a major split in Ak Zhol, the largest and best-funded of the three opposition parties, when one of its co-chairmen, Alikhan Baimenov, obtained support for a vote of no confidence in Altynbek Sarsenbayev, another co-chairman. He charged Sarsenbayev with violating party rules prohibiting collaboration with other parties. Sarsenbayev, who won the backing of other senior party figures, alleged that Baimenov had deliberately sought to destroy the party so there could be no serious challenger to Nazarbayev in the presidential election.


The Neglect of Policy

Even if Miss Ergalieva’s claims turn out to be false, the strategy she described in her letter to her political colleagues is unlikely to give the opposition a greater role in the country’s political life, or to advance the cause of political pluralism. The impatience of small parties which have no foreseeable prospect of influence, let alone office, is understandable. But one consequence is that they have been distracted from the important task of detailed criticism of government policy and of winning support for coherent and credible alternatives. This was particularly evident during the campaign for the September 2004 elections to the Majilis when all three Opposition parties concentrated their efforts on making criticisms of the election arrangements, arguing - often without a great deal of credibility - that they had been unfairly disadvantaged by them. On policy issues the main Opposition spokesman had virtually nothing credible to say.

Yet it is precisely in the field of policy that small political parties with commitment and intellectual firepower can have a disproportionate impact on public debate.

Despite forecasts of a low turn-out, 59 per cent of those eligible to vote in the September 2004 elections actually did so, but public cynicism is likely to grow and voter turn-out to dwindle if the public concludes that politics is merely about competition for power and spoils, and that those who seek office have only a superficial interest in the issues which will determine the country’s future.

In the past, Opposition parties have generally enjoyed sympathetic treatment from Western NGOs and Western newspapers. As a result of the anti-authority bias of many Western journalists, there will always be some prepared to side with the perceived underdog. But, if Opposition politicians continue to resemble footballers who feign spectacular dives in the penalty area in order to claim an unearned advantage, that support may wane.

In observing how democracy functions elsewhere, most Opposition politicians seem only to have noticed one aspect of the democratic system: that it is the task of the Opposition to oppose. While this is certainly true, what they have most certainly failed to notice is that such opposition takes place within the context of shared values and conventions. Quite obviously, the behaviour of opposition leaders in the West is not invariably restrained, dignified or moderate. But it would be wrong to conclude that democratic politics is no more than unfettered competition for position or power. All mature democratic states have conventions and rules that regulate the behaviour of the political players. In this respect, politics resembles competitive games far more closely than the law of the jungle: those taking part may compete ruthlessly but in the main they do so according to the rules, without which “the game” cannot take place.

The Opposition’s determination to resist the Government’s overtures to collaborate with it is symbolised not only by the refusal of Ak-Zhol to take up the seat it won in the September elections to the Majilis, but also by the Opposition’ decision to boycott the National Commission on Democratisation and Civil Society. Set up by President Nazarbayev in November 2004, the declared purpose of the Commission is to involve all democratic forces in charting the future process of political reform in Kazakhstan.

The Opposition’s decision not to participate may reflect the belief that its influence will be minimal. If so, its dilemma is far from unique; indeed, it mirrors that of many political parties in established democracies which have been invited to join broadly-based political programmes or structures. In such instances, the leaders of the opposition are apt to fear they are simply token figures whose involvement will lend legitimacy to the aims of their political opponents. For their part, government leaders may be anxious about allowing opposition parties too large an influence. In many cases, agreement can be reached through negotiation and compromise.

The Kazakh Opposition’s decision not to join the Commission rules out the possibility of a negotiated process, although this might have served as a valuable learning experience for Government and Opposition alike. But the continuing boycott of the Commission seems more likely to result in a process of political polarisation than to assist the growth of democracy.

Commenting on the present state of the Kazakh Opposition, a recent article in the Asia Daily Monitor, published by the Washington-based Jamestown Foundation, concluded: “Perhaps the saddest point is that opposition forces are increasingly drifting away from fundamental social problems that would have greater appeal in Kazakhstan. DCK has also been seriously weakened by internal strife within its ranks. In recent months many popular figures like Gulzhan Yergalieva, Petr Svoik, Karlygaash Zhakyanov … and others left the party. Under these circumstances, the authorities can dismiss the DCK as nothing more than a paper tiger – a shapeless, motley crew of power- hungry political adventurers.”

It is also evident that the standing of the Kazakh Opposition parties among Western parliamentarians has fallen in recent months. The statement from two British MEPs and a member of the Scottish Assembly who attended the September 2004 election as observers specifically took issue with Altynbek Sarsenbayev’s claim that the elections were rigged, explaining that nothing that they had observed supported his claim. Their statement concluded: “From the eye-witness observation undertaken and the interviews with political leaders, election officials, party representatives and individual voters, we conclude overall that the election appeared to be normal, democratic and fair and, in this respect, almost unique for Central Asia. ”


Modest Grounds for Optimism

A rare but welcome sign that Kazakhstan’s Opposition parties have begun to realise the drawbacks of the political “bear garden” came during the run-up to the September 2004 elections with agreement on a charter that sought to place limits on political competition. All the political parties, including those supporting the government, pledged to promote transparent, honest and fair elections and declared a moratorium on the use of slander or smearing among political rivals. Although the charter was honoured as much in the breach as in the observance, the fact that it received multi-party support showed that one small step on the path to political maturity had been taken.

Failure to achieve this would confirm the growing impression that the Opposition parties are unable to make a meaningful contribution to the political development of their country.

No government is likely to spend much time worrying about the weakness of its political opponents, but there are signs that even the administration is aware that the country’s image may be damaged and its long-term ambitions to play a greater international role may suffer if a credible opposition fails to emerge.

“Kazakhstan needs a political opposition,” Ermukhumet Ertysbaev, the President’s political adviser said at a meeting at the Institute of Economic Affairs in London on 9th March. “If it did not exist, we would have to invent it. We need an energetic Opposition that plays a full role in the nation’s political life.”

The growth of opposition parties in other transitional states suggests a number of steps that could be adopted to improve the long term credibility and prospects of the Kazakh Opposition. These include:

• The unambiguous repudiation of direct-action and of civil disobedience in favour of purely democratic methods;

• Much greater emphasis on policy analysis and the formulation of alternative policy approaches through the creation of public policy research institutes and think-tanks;

• The concentration of resources on those areas where the government’s record is perceived to be weak (e.g. the environment, especially issues relating to the huge man-made disasters of the disappearing Aral Sea and the nuclear contaminated region of Semipalatinsk);

• The use of international and regional forums to develop co-operative responses to regional problems (e.g. rural poverty, water shortage, population movement, etc.) rather than simply denigrating the government;

• A more measured and intelligent approach to the problems of corruption which is endemic to the region, and which acts as a brake on economic development. It is not credible to blame everything on the government - some of Nazarbayev’s anti-corruption measures, for example, the introduction of competitive examinations in the public service, the announcement of a substantial increase in the salaries of judges and the amnesty for capital flight, should be applauded. An effective and imaginative opposition would come up with further ideas for combating the problem.

The search for an opposition candidate to oppose Nazarbayev ended in March of this year when the country’s opposition parties agreed to support Zhamakhan Tuyakbai, a former Parliamentary speaker and ex-leader of Otan. The choice of Tuyakbai confounded those who suggested that the opposition parties were incapable of backing a single candidate. However, in the circumstances, the choice of candidate may be less important than the Opposition’s collective readiness to reject facile and misleading comparisons with political events elsewhere, to develop a reasonably coherent set of policy ideas, and to prevent the alliance from fragmenting during the course of the campaign. Self-discipline of that kind would provide the best evidence that the Opposition is beginning to understand that a commitment to democratic values implies a certain mode of conduct as well as the right to criticise.


Harming Prospects for Reform

In transitional states the blame for delays or reversals in the process of democratic reform must lie primarily with the government. But the development of strong democratic institutions and conventions also depends upon the emergence of vigorous and responsible Opposition parties. A government which favours cautious piecemeal political reform - a description that could be applied to the government in Astana – may reasonably hesitate or delay if it believes its political opponents appear to have abandoned conventional democratic politics for a strategy based on rash opportunism and an apparent readiness to incite to civil disobedience and law-breaking. A government that is instinctively fearful of change - which is how some critics of the Kazakh president view his administration - would undoubtedly cite such factors as an excuse for refusing to even contemplate change. Whichever description of the Government is the more apt, the political Opposition in Kazakhstan risks failing the democratic ideals which it claims to uphold by placing obstacles in the path of reform.

The truth is that the spectre of the “orange revolution” does not hang like a cloud over Kazakhstan. The evident progress achieved through radical economic change and piecemeal political reform means that no visitor is likely to come away from the country believing that it does. The attempt to encourage Western media and NGOs to believe otherwise - and worse still, to manufacture conditions in which such claims appear credible - is likely to fail. The main casualty will be the Opposition itself, but it is also possible that that process of political reform will also be harmed.