CIC Occasional Paper No. 11 - Kazakhstan and the OSCE: The 2005 Presidential Election and Kazakhstan's Bid to Lead the OSCE in 2009

Kazakhstan and the OSCE

The 2005 Presidential Election and
Kazakhstan’s Bid to Lead the OSCE in 2009

Occasional Paper No. 11

© June 2006




Foreword

By The Rt. Hon. Lord Parkinson


In December 2005 I led a team of observers to monitor the Presidential Election in Kazakhstan under the auspices of the London-based Caspian Information Centre. This paper, written by Gerald Frost, the General Director of the CIC, contains some interesting reflections prompted by our visit.

What puzzled all of us in the aftermath of the election was why our impression of the election, and those of a number of other international, independent monitoring groups, differed from those of the OSCE/ODIHR. These differences were reflected in our respective reports. Our team, which included a number of extremely experienced and independent minded parliamentarians and political analysts, concluded along with others that despite a number of flaws in the conduct of the election, some of them technical, Kazakhstan was heading in the right direction in terms of the development of its democracy.

In our judgement, the election was probably the freest and fairest in the country’s brief history as an independent state. Broadly speaking, this also seemed to be the view of the ordinary voters that we talked to. Nothing has caused us to change our minds. The Preliminary and Final Reports OSCE/ODIHR, however, although they acknowledged a number of specific improvements, were far more critical.

Mr Frost’s paper offers a number of explanations as to why the OSCE/ODIHR report differed significantly from our own. It is not necessary to agree with all of his judgements to recognise that it raises important questions about the most appropriate means to evaluate progress in new and emerging democracies; and about the need to bear in mind that judgements about such matters can be influenced by the interests and political philosophy of the observers as well as by wider political developments. It also points to some new – and to my mind disturbing – features about the international order.

I recommend this paper to all students of international politics, and especially to those in government with responsibilities for their country’s relations with those states such as Kazakhstan which are currently making the difficult and painful transition from authoritarian to democratic rule.


Parkinson
London, June 2006



Introduction & Background

It would be an exaggeration to say that the issue of whether the Central Asian Republic of Kazakhstan should succeed in its ambition to become Chairman-in-Office of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in 2009 is one which constantly grips the minds of policy élites in Europe and the US. Kazakhstan’s relatively recent appearance on the international stage, and the growing respect with which it is treated by its immediate neighbours, China and Russia, and also by the United States, is largely (although by no means exclusively) a consequence of its huge energy reserves. There are as yet, however, very few experts in the ranks of Western governments with more than a superficial knowledge of Kazakhstan’s affairs. Outside of government, an even smaller number of Western academics possess deep knowledge of the region and its prospects that can be put at the service of policy-makers.

The OSCE, meanwhile, may be the fastest growing of the world’s leading inter-governmental organisations – its budget has increased by 1400 per cent since 1992 – but it is almost certainly the least well-known. It is likely that only a tiny proportion of the public could say what the initials of the organisation stand for or describe its role, let alone offer a view about whether it is serving the interests of the taxpayers who fund it. Nevertheless, the issues raised by Kazakhstan’s ambition to lead the organisation in 2009 is an important and revealing one because of the light they throw on important features of the international order and upon the growing importance of the Caspian region.

The OSCE, formerly called the “Conference for Security and Co-operation in Europe” (CSCE), is the product of the détente period of the Cold War, but unlike some other Cold War institutions it has grown and prospered in the post-Cold War era. Established in 1973 at the instigation of the Soviet Union, the Soviets saw the organisation as a way of legitimising their control over Eastern and Central Europe and as the means to decouple Western Europe from its US ally. For their part, Western democracies believed that the talks – which opened in Helsinki in November 1972 - could provide the means to reduce East-West tensions, develop economic cooperation with the Soviet bloc and improve the condition of those living under Communist rule.

Although the Helsinki process (as it quickly came to be known) had its critics, many believed that it had the potential to normalise relations with the Soviet Union and thereby contribute to Western security. Western politicians and diplomats envisaged a patient process of diplomacy and dialogue with the Soviet Union through which human rights and democratic values could be promoted. As the Soviet Union was increasingly drawn into an expanding network of political, economic and cultural ties it would – or so it was argued - come to realise that acts of aggression would put at risk the benefits it had gained through participating in the process. As a result, the ideological hostility which had defined East-West relations since 1917 would gradually abate and the risk of a thermo-nuclear war would recede. Thus, in Western eyes, the organisation’s overriding purpose was to contribute to European security and stability – an aim to which the organisation remains formally committed. The extent to which the CSCE played a part in the collapse of communism and the end of East-West hostility remains, however, a matter of dispute among historians and policy analysts.

Until 1990, the CSCE largely functioned as a series of meetings and conferences that sought to build and extend the commitments of the 35 participating countries. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, however, the CSCE claimed a new and no less ambitious role: that of managing the historic change taking place in Europe and of enhancing security on both sides of the former ideological divide - a role set out in the Charter of Paris for a New Europe of 1990. The difference was symbolised by the change of name: what was previously a forum for debate and discussion was now an Organisation with its own permanent staff, operational capabilities and permanent institutions, including a Secretariat, Council, Parliamentary Assembly, Centre for Conflict Resolution and Bureau for Free Elections.

Today the OSCE, which describes itself as the largest security organisation in the world, includes 55 participating states from Europe, the Mediterranean, the Caucasus, Central Asia and North America; it employs 440 people in its institutions plus 750 international and 2,370 local staff. Based in Vienna, the organisation also has offices in Copenhagen, Geneva, The Hague, Prague and Warsaw, while its budget has grown from €12 million in 1993 to €168 million during the present year.

As some opportunities for OSCE activity declined, notably in the area of arms control, new opportunities presented themselves, mostly in the area of human rights. Moreover, it was an organisation whose separate components themselves quickly expanded and acquired new functions. Thus, the Bureau for Free Elections quite quickly became the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), an organisation whose new title and Warsaw-based headquarters reflected the body’s rapidly expanding ambitions. Today, ODIHR not only monitors elections, but also seeks to promote the democratic process more generally, assists participating states in the implementation of what it refers to as the “human dimension”, through long term programmes to strengthen the rule of law, civil society and democratic governance; it also contributes to “early warning and conflict prevention”, implements a “gender strategy” and provides human rights training. These roles, combined with those of other OSCE institutions (the Commissioner on National Minorities, the Representative on Freedom of the Media and the Parliamentary Assembly), mean that there is no item on the international political agenda about which the OSCE does not seek to promote its view. In doing so, its spokesmen make it clear that its ability to promote stability, democracy and human rights reflects the organisation’s distinctive characteristics:

“Compared with other organisations, the OSCE is unique in several ways; its broad membership of Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian States; its cooperative and comprehensive approach to security; its conflict-prevention instruments; its well established tradition of open dialogue and consensus building; its large operational network of field missions; and its well developed pattern of cooperation with other international organisations.”


The Philosophy of the OSCE

The philosophy that underlies the work of the OSCE has much in common with other international bodies and institutions, such as the European Union, United Nations, the International Criminal Court and the World Bank, all of which claim in one form or another to represent global civil society through the promotion of universal norms of global governance. In this process, directly-elected politicians have only a limited role: the emerging system of global governance is run by inter-locking networks of trans-national élites, including lawyers, judges, NGOs and the officials of the UN and other international organisations.

Human rights and international law is the moral and intellectual basis for the global governance regime of which the OSCE is an important component. The starting point is the assertion that individuals possess certain human rights. The problem with both human rights and indeed international law, however, is that they are porous, fluid and changing all of the time. John Fonte, a fellow of the Washington-based Hudson Institute, has coined the phrase “trans-national progressivism” to describe the philosophy which underlies this relatively new political development.

“They [human rights and international law] are, at any given moment, what trans-national élites tell us they are. NGOs participate in the writing of global treaties alongside democratic and non-democratic governments, but they are essentially pressure groups, elected by no one and responsible only to themselves. Nor are the other élites, the international lawyers, judges, activists and officials who participate in the global governance system, responsible or accountable to any self-governing people. How can these rulers be replaced? How can “the governed” repeal bad laws and regulations that their “governors” have imposed upon them? Global governance provides no democratic answers to these questions.

“Global governance is implicitly a grand ideological project (and a utopian and coercive one, with universal aspirations). It is post-democratic in the sense that it originates but transcends democracy just as the “post-modern” originates from but transcends modernity. Its success would mean that liberal democracy very well might be replaced with a new form of regime.”

In theory, the OSCE is ultimately answerable to Member States via the Council of Ministers; in practice, the relationship is very different. It is the senior staff and spokesmen of the OSCE who pass judgement on the record and conduct of Member States, rather than the other way around.

OSCE literature lays stress on the organisation’s readiness to “assist” Member States in meeting their international obligations, but the OSCE’s role is far from being a merely passive or supportive one.

In the post-Cold War era, the organisation sees its task as that of holding Member States to their commitments under the terms of OSCE membership and using its considerable resources to draw the world’s attention to any shortcomings in order to exert pressure for change. In this process, the OSCE can count on the help of sympathetic NGOs, other inter-governmental bodies and, of course, the international media. States which are held to be in breach of their commitments may subsequently find themselves subject to a public dressing-down from a US Secretary of State or British Foreign Secretary, as well as criticised in the international media; they may also face sanctions of various kinds. Western criticism of oppressive and brutal governments elsewhere in the world is not, of course, new; what is new is that the process described above is now initiated by an organisation of non-accountable international civil servants.

One of the many ironies of the present situation is that the OSCE does not itself live up to the universal standards of democratic accountability and transparency that it seeks to promote. The organisation’s negotiating and decision-making bodies – the Ministerial Council, the Permanent Council and the Forum for Security Cooperation – reach their decisions behind closed doors, allowing the media access only to the non-controversial parts of its meetings in which there is predictably little interest. Asked to justify the exclusion of the press and public from the meetings of an organisation which identifies the elimination of barriers to press freedom as a major part of its work, a spokesman for the organisation’s press office in Vienna told the author: “We sympathise with those who say our meetings should be open and transparent, but decisions are reached by consensus and we feel that if we were to do this it would inhibit debate.” These were, of course, precisely the reasons British governments gave for refusing to admit the press to Parliament in the 18th century.

Lack of transparency is not the only reason why the work of the OSCE escapes the critical scrutiny which politicians and institutions are customarily subject to in a democracy. Ultimately, the reason for the lack of public debate about its affairs is due to fact that there is no demos, or people, to whom those who run the global governance regime are accountable. Lord Dahrendorf, a distinguished former EU Commissioner and academic, once said of the European Union that if it applied to itself the criteria that it applied to those wishing to join the EU it could not be admitted ; an identical charge could be levelled at the OSCE.

In a mature democracy, media comment makes due allowance for the possibility that politicians and public servants may be swayed by self-interest. Neither the record of inefficient and sometimes corrupt UN agencies, nor the increasing reputation of the “Public Choice” school of economics - which seeks to explain political phenomena in terms of the self-interest of the main political players - has yet led to serious media scrutiny of inter-governmental bodies such as the OSCE. Consequently, if such bodies behave in a way that undermines the interests of the taxpayers who fund their activities, or they simply lose sight of their central objectives, this is a matter which may go largely unnoticed for some time.



Monitoring Elections

There are different ways of evaluating an election. The simplest technique is to test political realities against an abstract model regardless of historical and regional factors. This is the method used by the OSCE’s Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR). As a previous CIC publication has made clear, if the bar is set too high few elections would past muster . Bruce George, the British Member of Parliament who chairs the OSCE’s Parliamentary Assembly, has described the OSCE/ODIHR measure as the “gold standard of democracy”. By contrast, a senior American observer who monitored the 4th December Presidential election in Kazakhstan said that no country in the world could have passed the test set by the OSCE/ODIHR on that occasion.

The abstract test favoured by ODIHR reflects the philosophy described earlier: the criteria set are not merely demanding, but go far beyond what many people would regard as relevant to considerations of whether an election is free and fair, nor do they allow for differences of political culture. Thus the OSCE’s report on the UK Parliamentary Election of 2005 found it noteworthy that prisoners were not allowed to vote. Similarly, issues of gender equality figure prominently in all of the OSCE/ODIHR reports on elections, even though many people would regard this an issue separate from that of democracy.

A more sophisticated and perhaps fairer way of observing elections is also to take into account the direction of political developments. This is the method followed by the CIC’s own election monitoring team led by the former Chairman of the British Conservative Party, The Rt. Hon. Lord Parkinson, and expounded by the distinguished political scientists, Professor Kenneth Minogue and Professor Dennis O’Keeffe, of the London School of Economics and the University of Buckingham. This sought to focus on the progress that Kazakhstan has made in the 4th December election compared with previous elections. As we noted in our inquiry into the preparation for the elections:

“This technique of ‘Developmental Observation’ assumes that what is important is the way things are moving rather than how they appear in a snapshot. Freedom and democracy are complex and difficult practices, and it is absurd to expect them to be acquired overnight. On the other hand, this more sophisticated technique means that we now need to know - to put it crudely - not only what is happening now but also what was happening in the past, and both these dimensions are slippery to grasp. And from these already uncertain dimensions we are also seeking to predict how the society will move in the near future.”

Significantly, the same point was made by Mr Matthew Bryza, a senior US State Department official, when commenting on arrangements for the 4th December Presidential election:

“It’s impossible for any country to flip the switch one day or in one election and suddenly have an ideal democratic political environment. That is just not how human nature works. What matters is that countries are moving decisively, constantly – but at the pace that is reflective of reality – towards democratic institutions.”

In part – but only part - differences in technique may help to explain the differences in the conclusions reached by the OSCE/ODIHR and other observers, including the CIC’s own observation team. The CIC observers concluded: “The 4th December election has been the freest, fairest and certainly the most transparent election to have occurred in Kazakhstan’s brief history as an independent state … At this election, Kazakhstan has taken a major step forward in becoming a full democracy. The international community should encourage Kazakhstan to pursue the process of embedding its democratic institutions and to create a genuinely free society.”

The CIC was not alone in reaching such a conclusion. Seven other observer missions who issued immediate statements following the election – including legislators from the US, Belgium, France, Indonesia and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, were in broad agreement. But the Preliminary Findings and Conclusions of the OSCE/ODIHR, issued at a press conference on the day after the election, while acknowledging nine specific improvements, appeared to be in stark contrast:

“Despite some improvements in the administration of this election in the pre-election period, the presidential election did not meet a number of OSCE commitments and other international standards for democratic elections. Candidate registration was mostly inclusive and a field of five candidates provided voters with an opportunity for choice. However, numerous and persistent examples of intimidation by the authorities, including undue restrictions on campaigning and harassment of campaign staff, limited the possibility for a meaningful competition whereby all candidates had equal opportunities to convey their views to the electorate.”

Inevitably, the international media, with only few exceptions, concentrated on the negative judgements contained in the OSCE/ODIHR report – while ignoring the very fundamental improvements buried in the text, and as well as the assessments of other observers. Many newspapers and television reports consequently described the election as “rigged”.

The more critical tone of the OSCE/ODIHR report may be explained in part by the methodology they adopted, but the organisation’s overall assessment is open to criticism on a number of other grounds.

Probably the most damning criticism contained in its Preliminary Findings and Conclusions is the reference to “… numerous and persistent harassment, intimidation and detention of campaign staff and supporters of opposition candidates, including beating of campaign staff.” This may be found on page one of the report. However, when the OSCE/ODIHR’s Final Report appeared more than two months later, this referred to “… cases of harassment of campaign staff and an atmosphere of intimidation (emphasis added).” This, more reserved judgment, appears on page one of the Final Report. Whether or not a particular atmosphere exists is, of course, a subjective matter and one which is difficult to verify after the event. Moreover, it is noteworthy that the words “numerous and persistent” have been dropped altogether from the summary of the Final Report.

It is, however, the Preliminary report to which the international media paid attention. By the time the Final Report appeared eight weeks later, the media caravan had moved on. Whether or not the headline-grabbing criticism contained in the immediate post-election report was justified depends on whether or not there were indeed “numerous and persistent examples of intimidation and harassment”. At the time of writing, the Government of Kazakhstan says that the OSCE/ODIHR has still not responded to its repeated requests for the evidence to support this claim.

None of this need be regarded as a criticism of the integrity or conscientiousness of the hundreds of individuals who monitored the election in accordance with the instructions of the OSCE/ODIHR’s core staff of professional experts. However, the difference between the two reports is plainly more than one of tone and does raise questions about the way in which their findings were presented.

As two independent observers commented:

“Regrettably, the reporting of OSCE findings seems calculated to arouse resentment even among the best-intentioned countries that it reviews, including Kazakhstan. Specifically, the OSCE has adopted a preachy, condescending, Euro-centric and arrogant attitude that systematically offends those it seeks to persuade. No wonder that even some of Kazakhstan’s confirmed democrats refer disdainfully to the OSCE mission as the ‘democracy police...’

“In a kind of inversion of what most would accept as effective pedagogy, OSCE dwells on the negatives and is stingy with its praise for positive achievements. Only after this does one get a chance to learn whether the election represented a step forward or step back.”

The suspicion that the presentation of findings was marred by a lack of proportion and a pronounced tendency to push the human rights agenda way beyond the limits of common sense, was strengthened by the OSCE/ODIHR attitude towards a change in the country’s Elections Law ahead of the 4th December election. This took the form of an amendment to Article 44.6 of the Elections Law banning political demonstrations (but not other types of peaceful assembly) during the brief period between the end of voting and the declaration of the result, the amendment having been promulgated with the declared aim of preventing attempts to influence the authorities responsible for conducting the count.

By definition, this temporary ban could not have affected the result. The time-frame of the ban was, in all probability, up to 24 hours at most. Moreover, the circumstances leading to its introduction are not difficult to understand: in the months prior to the election numerous opposition politicians and journalists suggested that the so-called “coloured revolutions” that occurred in Georgia, the Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan were part of a pattern that would sweep across the Caspian and Caucasus to engulf Kazakhstan. Many of these suggested the return of the incumbent President would provide the trigger for just such a political upheaval.

In tones which might have been appropriate had the Government of Kazakhstan been seeking to introduce draconian measures to limit the most basic of human rights or given its blessing to the use of child labour, the OSCE/ODIHR declared:

“This amendment violates both the right to freedom of association and the right to peaceful assembly. Both rights are fundamental and universally recognised and are contained in both the OSCE Copenhagen Document and the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights.”

This criticism was given prominence in the OSCE/ODIHR Needs Assessment Report – the document issued by the organisation ahead of an election in order to establish whether its monitoring mission will be deployed in that Member State and indicate the areas for improvement for it to meet its OSCE commitments – and repeated in both its Preliminary and Final Reports .

In fact, the “rights” to which OSCE/ODIHR refers are not universally recognised and even in Western democratic states public demonstrations are subject to temporary suspension. The most vivid example is France, where the recent imposition of a full-blown curfew following street rioting went substantially further than the limited measures envisaged by the Government of Kazakhstan. Another example is Northern Ireland, where the Parades Commission regulates the custom of Catholic and Protestant groups to assemble and conduct marches, and has sometimes banned marches in instances where it believed these would result in sectarian violence. Similarly, protest meetings on a Sydney beach have recently been banned for fear of clashes between Lebanese immigrants and other ethnic groups. Needless to say, neither the French or British governments, nor that of New South Wales, have been condemned at the bar of international opinion for breaches of fundamental rights.

More remarkably, in censoring the Kazakhstan Government for what could reasonably be regarded as a prudent measure to ensure public order, the OSCE/ODIHR would appear to have misread the OSCE’s own Copenhagen Document as well as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The relevant passage from the Copenhagen Document reads “…everyone will have the right of peaceful assembly and demonstration. Any restrictions which may be placed on the exercise of these rights will be prescribed by law and consistent with international standards (emphasis added).” The wording of the relevant section of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights is almost identical: “The right of peaceful assembly shall be recognized. No restrictions may be placed on the exercise of this right other than those imposed in conformity with the law and which are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or public safety, public order (ordre public), the protection of public health or morals or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others (emphasis added).”

The Kazakhstan Government consequently was not in breach of international law when it placed a ban on political demonstrations for a brief period following the 4th December Presidential election; its ban was prescribed by law and consistent with standards applied elsewhere. It is questionable whether even the wiliest of international lawyers could make a convincing case to the contrary.

In summarising its conclusions, the OSCE/ODIHR states in its Final Report: “Overall, despite some important improvement in the administration of this election in the pre-election period, the election did not meet a number of OSCE commitments and other international standards for democratic elections. The authorities of Kazakhstan did not fully fulfil their obligations regarding the 1990 Copenhagen Document, in particular election-specific commitments 7.3,7.4, 7.6, 7.8, and did not meet commitment 7.7.”

Despite the legalistic language, this sounds serious. But those reading the report will have little idea about the nature of the shortcomings in the conduct of the 2005 Presidential election because it does not list or explain the commitments which Kazakhstan is said to have failed to uphold, nor are these included in an appendix. Only those taking the trouble to refer to the original Copenhagen Document will know what these commitments mean. For example, 7.3 guarantees universal and equal suffrage to adult citizens. The reader will then have to work out whether the evidence presented justifies such a judgement. In the case of 7.3, it is difficult to know how such a conclusion could have been reached; there appears to be no supporting evidence and the claim is not borne out by other observer missions.

In the case of 7.4, which requires “… that votes are cast by secret ballot or by equivalent free voting procedure and they are counted and reported honestly”, the authorities may not have achieved the OSCE/ODIHR “gold standard”, but it clearly went a long way in doing so. The assertion that the commitment was “not fully met” may well be true, but it may also be said of many elections around the world, including the 2004 British parliamentary election in which the police uncovered significant rigging of postal ballots. The vagueness of the report’s language, unsupported by detailed evidence, is ultimately meaningless. In fact, the OSCE/ODIHR’s report leaves the reader in doubt about what, if any, progress was achieved.

Similar doubts apply in the case of several other OSCE commitments. An election monitoring mission involving hundreds of trained personnel and costing hundreds of thousands of dollars in taxpayers’ money should surely provide a clearer picture of the extent to which important commitments were met and what progress, if any, was made.

Less serious, but still a matter of concern, was the tendency to give prominence to minor or trivial matters, some of a technical nature. Thus, the fact that the President chose not to appear in a television debate with other candidates – which was his right – is given greater prominence than the fact that the situation in 92 per cent of voting stations was judged to be “positive”. Elsewhere, there is needless complaint about lengthy queues and crowded voting stations – both the consequence of an impressive turnout (75 per cent) of which most mature democracies would be envious.

One way of improving the OSCE/ODIHR assessment would be to apply a qualitative scale akin to that used for bond ratings or to measure credit worthiness rather than a simplistic pass or fail evaluation, as Professor Frederick Starr, head of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute at John Hopkins University, has suggested . Such a grading would give a clear picture of progress or backsliding and would consequently send important signals regarding political risk and stability.

An organisation which boasts of applying a “gold standard” in its evaluations of democratic elections, including those held in countries with only the briefest experience of self-government, obviously has a responsibility to ensure that its own work meets the highest possible standards of fairness, impartiality and intellectual rigour. In the case of the 4th December Presidential election in Kazakhstan, the OSCE quite clearly failed in this regard. This failing is compounded by the organisation’s unwillingness to enter into a debate with its critics or to discuss alternative ways of evaluating elections, a reluctance which, given the organisation’s stated purposes, is bound to raise serious questions. Overall, the impression given is of an assessment that is fundamentally flawed because the OSCE/ODIHR’s evident desire to promote its own agenda resulted in a lack of proportion and even a readiness to criticise on the basis of tendentious interpretations of its own principles. If the ODIHR wishes to maintain its claim as the foremost election monitoring organisation in Europe and Central Asia, it needs urgently to review its methods.



Kazakhstan’s Bid to Lead the OSCE

The OSCE’s Chairman-in-Office (CiO) is the foreign minister of the country holding the organisation’s rotating chairmanship. His responsibilities include the co-ordination of OSCE institutions, the supervision of activities relating to conflict prevention, crisis management and “post-conflict rehabilitation”, as well as the task of representing the organisation to the wider world. The CiO is assisted by the previous and succeeding chairman; the three of them constituting the Troika. Former communist states which have chaired the organisation include Czechoslovakia (1992), Hungary (1995), Poland (1998), Romania (2001), Bulgaria (2004), and Slovenia (2005). However, if Kazakhstan were to succeed in claiming the chairmanship in 2009, it would be the first CIS member and the first Muslim country to do so.

The OSCE chairmanship has been a consistent goal of the Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev, and this ambition has featured repeatedly in his annual State of the Nation address as well as in numerous speeches to foreign and domestic audiences. Foreign diplomats have sometimes been surprised by the single-minded way in which the Kazakhstan Government has pursued this goal. The reasons for this ambition are in fact not difficult to discern: President Nazarbayev clearly regards the prize as fitting acknowledgment for his country’s economic, social and political progress to-date, and confirmation that Kazakhstan is now the recognised Central Asian leader. The attainment of this goal would, he argues, have a positive effect on the economic and social reform of the region as a whole. It would also reward his country for the responsible role it has played on the international stage, including its decision to dismantle its nuclear arsenal following Independence, its readiness to play a constructive role in opposing terrorism, its contribution to halt the traffic in people and drugs as well as its support for post-conflict reconstruction in Afghanistan and Iraq.

That the President should appear to take the matter personally is also unsurprising. As the Founding Father of the independent Republic of Kazakhstan, his approach has been to put economic growth before political reform in the belief that the latter would have a greater prospect of success if carried out against a background of increasing prosperity and economic opportunity. Despite the demands of critics at home and abroad for a more radical political reform programme, it is now clear that this approach has enabled Kazakhstan to fulfil one of the most fundamental conditions for any country seeking to become a democracy: the creation of a middle class. It would not be unreasonable, therefore, if Nazarbayev regarded the prize of OSCE chairmanship as international recognition that his political strategy is paying off.

There are two further reasons why Kazakhstan’s goal of securing the OSCE leadership should be taken seriously. The first is that it would recognise the fact that the organisation is now a Eurasian and not a purely European one; it would consequently dispel the suspicion that there is a prejudice against CIS/Central Asian members, or that these are regarded as second-class citizens or probationers (already there are signs that a distinct group of Central Asian members believe that its interests are not adequately respected by a Eurocentric majority). Second, it would dispel the claim that in seeking the leadership of the organisation, a country with a predominantly Muslim population is likely to be met with suspicion or mistrust. Kazakhstan is remarkably free of religious fanaticism of any kind, but radical Islamic groups, mostly based outside the country, would almost certainly seek to exploit the feelings of resentment to which a rejection of Kazakhstan’s bid to chair the organisation might lead.

It follows that the rejection of Kazakhstan’s bid to lead the OSCE in 2009 will be keenly felt in Astana, and the motives behind it subjected to a great deal of critical analysis. More generally, it could lead to degree of cynicism about democratic politics and the high ideals which the OSCE seeks to uphold.

Thus far, Kazakhstan has pursued a multi-vector foreign policy whereby good relations with its big neighbours, Russia and China, are pursued as energetically as those with the US and the EU. However, in shaping policies for economic and political reform, the lessons learned have come from the West or from those countries, notably Singapore, which have experience of adapting Western-style liberal democracy to national conditions. Kazakhstan has also benefited massively from Western investment in its booming energy sector. But if its ambition in respect of the OSCE were to be thwarted, the result could be a weakening of the pro-Western elements within Kazakhstan’s political élite and a reorientation of Kazakhstan’s foreign and domestic policy.

There is a body of opinion in the Kazakhstan Government which clearly believes that the OSCE is opposed to its bid. There are even those who have a lingering suspicion that the flaws in the arrangements and conduct of Kazakhstan’s Presidential election on 4th December 2005, in which President Nazarbayev achieved a landslide victory, were deliberately overstated by the OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission in order to prevent its claim from succeeding. However, it is not only the interests of Kazakhstan which might suffer as a consequence of failing to claim a prize that its government believes has been well-earned. Both the country’s huge energy reserves – Kazakhstan is set to become one of the world’s top ten producers within the next 15 years - and its potential to help stabilise an inherently unstable region, suggest that it is in the West’s interest to anchor the country as firmly to the West as geo-political factors allow.

A series of high-level visits in the last year from US political leaders, including Donald Rumsfeld, Condoleeza Rice, Henry Kissinger, Bill Clinton and, most recently, Donald Cheney, underline the fact that this is now better understood in Washington than in some European capitals, and that many Americans within influential policy-making circles recognise that, following developments elsewhere in the region, Kazakhstan is America’s only possible strategic partner. During a recent visit to Astana, Vice President Cheney told President Nazarbayev: “Standing in this modern capital city, I am proud to affirm the strong ties between Kazakhstan and the United States. We have great respect, Mr. President, for all that you have accomplished in the last 15 years. And we are proud to be your strategic partner. My country looks forward to continued friendship between us as we work to enhance security to defend the peace and to build a better world.”

At the same time, the task of anchoring Kazakhstan firmly to the West would be made considerably more difficult were it to fail in its bid to claim the chairmanship of the OSCE in 2009. It is consequently hard to see how Western interests would be furthered by frustrating the desire of this former Soviet outpost to demonstrate the progress it has made since Independence by withholding from it the prize it seeks.

Kazakhstan plainly believes it has now jumped through the hoops set for it by the OSCE and other international organisations and countries, including the United States and the European Union. Since Independence in 1991, it has made substantial progress in establishing property rights and the rule of law, privatising its economy, reducing those living below the poverty line, building civil society, embarking on prison reform and introducing a moratorium on the death penalty. Political reform has come hesitantly at times and the country’s democratic institutions remain in their infancy, but even the OSCE has acknowledged that, for the first time in its history, voters had a genuine choice between candidates both in the election to the Majilis, Kazakhstan’s lower house in September 2004, and in the Presidential election of 4th December 2006.

Prior to the Presidential election, the message from most Western capitals was that, providing the conduct of the election showed further progress in developing the country’s new democratic institutions, no obstacle would be placed in the way of Kazakhstan’s claim to leadership of the OSCE in 2009. Conversely, Kazakhstan could not expect to claim the leadership of the organisation if the conduct of the election demonstrated that the political reform process had stalled or gone into reverse (a view expressed by some Kazakh opposition spokesman even before the campaign had started.) The outcome of Kazakhstan’s bid to lead the organisation would, therefore, depend on Western judgements about whether the election was free and fair and, crucially, these would hinge on the reports of the OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission.


The Impact of the OSCE/ODIHR Mission

The publication of the OSCE/ODIHR Needs Assessment Mission Report on 28th September had alerted members of the Kazakhstan Government both to the breadth of the organisation’s concerns and the exacting standards that the authorities in Astana would be expected to meet. It would consequently be an exaggeration to say that members of Kazakhstan’s ruling élite were wholly surprised by the tone and contents of the OSCE/ODIHR Preliminary Report and Findings published in the immediate aftermath of the election, or by the even more critical tone of international media coverage to which the report was predictably subjected.

It is clear that they were very disappointed by both. Kazakhstan had provided facilities as well as half the funding for more than 1,000 international observers, including 460 from the OSCE, all of whom enjoyed fuller and freer access to polling stations than would be the case in, for example, Britain or the United States, where national and some state’s law prohibits the presence of foreign observers.

Partly as the result of an extensive dialogue between Kazakhstan’s Central Election Commission and the professional staff of the ODIHR, numerous improvements were made in the preparations for the election. In the judgement of the CIC mission led by The Rt. Hon. Lord Parkinson - and which included, among others, The Hon. Nirj Deva, MEP, who led the EU monitoring mission to the largest elections in the world (Indonesia 2004) - these displayed a greater degree of openness and professionalism than was the case during the elections to the Majilis on 19th September 2004, which in turn represented an improvement on earlier elections.

Specific improvements included the posting of voter lists in polling stations two weeks ahead of polling day, the decision of the CEC to hold its meetings in public, and clearer guidance about the introduction of the “Sailu” e-voting system for those members of the public who chose to vote by electronic means. Despite the predictions of political violence and even revolution, the atmosphere on Election Day remained calm throughout, and there were no reports of violent protests or demonstration of any kind.

How then to explain OSCE/ODIHR’s negative assessment? A number of independent observers sensed that the inevitable consequence of the way in which the OSCE/ODIHR mission presented its findings was to inflict serious damage on Kazakhstan’s bid to claim the OSCE chairmanship. One observer noted after the election that the OSCE may have been concerned that if Kazakhstan achieved its ambition this might lead to greater influence within the organisation for Russia, Kazakhstan’s neighbour and regional ally - as well as a strong critic of the OSCE’s ODIHR. Instead of encouraging a newly-independent state that had demonstrated progress in strengthening its democracy, it was hard to escape the conclusion that an organisation which purportedly exists to promote democratic values had delivered it a kick in the teeth.

Despite the Kazakhstan Government’s commitment to the OSCE as a valuable benchmark by which it may demonstrate its membership of the international community of free nations, particularly with respect to its neighbours in the region, this interpretation is not discounted in Astana; it is one which is likely to encourage a degree of cynicism about the OSCE and more generally about the conduct and motives of Western democratic states. Such sentiments are likely to be felt more deeply if Kazakhstan’s bid to lead the OSCE is thwarted.

Such concerns are strengthened by the way in which some Western governments have defended the OSCE/ODIHR Mission. For example, a letter to the former Ulster Unionist cabinet minister and a member of the CIC Election Observation Mission, The RT. Hon. Lord Kilclooney, from the then Minister for Europe, The Rt. Hon. Douglas Alexander MP, following publication of the CIC’s post-election report, specifically cited Russian attempts to exert control over the organisation while completely ignoring the specific points raised by the CIC team. Mr Alexander’s letter states:

“We value the election observation work carried out by ODIHR, which is recognised as a model of its kind….”

“The OSCE’s work on elections has recently come under attack from some Commonwealth and Independent states, led by Russia, who would like to exert more control over ODHIR … The Foreign and Commonwealth Office will continue to support ODIHR’s election observation work and its work to improve democratic standards across the region.” (See Appendix E)

One interpretation of Mr Alexander’s letter is that Britain’s primary interest is to defend ODIHR against Russian attempts to influence the organisation, and it is consequently unwilling to discuss the ODIHR’s methods or their impact on the interests and reputation of a small country, even one in which British companies have made major investments, second only to the United States. Such attitudes are bound to encourage the belief in Astana that Kazakhstan is currently a victim of big-power rivalry and that despite the lofty aspirations expressed by the ODIHR, genuine and sustained efforts to promote democracy may be misrepresented if these conflict with the OSCE’s other concerns and political priorities.

Despite apprehensions about Russian motives in relation to the OSCE, Kazakhstan’s governing élites may reasonably conclude that they may also be the victims of double standards. The OSCE said nothing when Russia declined to invite the OSCE to the blatantly rigged elections in Chechnya in 2004. By contrast, Kazakhstan, which has invited the OSCE to observe all of its recent elections and has implemented a large number of changes on the basis of its recommendations, has found that its international reputation has been damaged because of factors for which it may not be responsible.



Wider Considerations

Sceptical observers may conclude that it is not just Kazakhstan’s interests that have been damaged in this process. The fundamental aim of the OSCE has always been to promote the security of Member States: for good reasons, the promotion of democratic values and human rights has been considered to be conducive to this aim. Few, if any, questioned the value of seeking to enhance political freedom and human rights in Soviet bloc countries during the Cold War era or doubted whether that this was beneficial to the security interests of the West.

In the post-Cold War era, the OSCE’s potential for good in these areas is plainly greater than in earlier times. But its task is also more complicated. When “assisting” Member States in making the transition from totalitarianism to democracy, what assumptions should it make about an appropriate pace of change? In the development of democratic institutions, what allowance should be made for national characteristics and culture? Is there a danger that premature or hasty reform can damage social cohesion and stability? If advice is delivered in an over-robust manner, is there a danger that such “assistance” can shade into bullying or coercion and consequently prove to be counter-productive? Does the OSCE require restructuring in order to reflect the fact that it is now a Eurasian as well as a European organisation?

There seems little sign that that the organisation’s decision-making bodies or core staff have grappled seriously with these questions. It may be that Kazakhstan’s success in claiming the chairmanship could initiate a debate which would begin to address them. The present structure of the organisation, which requires the chairman to work closely with the outgoing and the chairman-to-be, reduces the possibility of radical or ill-considered change.

As matters stand, given the OSCE/ODIHR’s hands-on role, there is a danger that the OSCE/ODIHR is itself becoming a political player in its own right, and this cannot but affect its impartiality as observer. It also seems clear that the increasingly pervasive philosophy which underlies the work of the OSCE has encouraged its proactive stance. The consequent dangers are illustrated by the case of the OSCE/ODIHR’s persistent criticism of the Kazakhstan Government’s amendment to Article 44.6 of the Elections law. In the weeks leading up to 4th December, numerous opposition spokesman and journalists, as well as representatives of the international media, warned of political violence and even revolution. Many quoted the OSCE/ODIHR’s criticism of the amendment to Article 44.6 as evidence that the Government’s determination to stifle dissent. The principle opposition candidate, Mr Zharmakhan Tuaybai, candidate of the coalition “Movement for a Just Kazakhstan”, who had dismissed the possibility of a fair election even before the campaign had begun, lent credence to this claim. He told members of the CIC team: “If the people rise I will be with them.”

Members of the opposition also claimed that the authorities would provoke violence in order to impose its will, and had recently purchased weapons for this purpose. In the event, the election passed off peacefully. But had the situation been as explosive as many commentators suggested, the OSCE/ODIHR’s condemnation of “unjust” laws could well have sparked illegal protests resulting in violence and loss of life.

The OSCE should not lose sight of the fact that most Governments have signed up to OSCE commitments because they believe that the promotion of democratic values is good for security. It is a truism that democratic states are less likely to go to war with one another than other states. But it is also the case that democratic institutions take time to evolve, and that those countries with the proudest record of self-government have democratic institutions that developed over centuries in a way that reflected their national character.

As Margaret Thatcher has written, “… a sound and stable international order can only be founded on respect for nations and nation states. Whatever the flaws of particular nationalisms, national pride and national institutions constitute the best grounding for a functioning democracy … The wise statesman will celebrate nationhood – and use it.”

Given the difficulties encountered in imposing democracy in Iraq and Afghanistan, it would seem unreasonable to expect a country whose sense of nationhood is still new and uncertain to conform to extremely demanding international norms of political behaviour and to do so almost overnight. Circumstances have forced Kazakhstan’s political leaders to be fast learners. But it is still the case that hasty, ill-considered or premature decisions could damage stability perhaps by disturbing the harmony which currently exists among the country’s diverse ethnic mix. If ill-considered or premature decisions are made as a result of international pressures, it will not be the unaccountable international servants of the OSCE or international human rights activists who will pay the price; even so Western interests may still be harmed.



Summary of Conclusions

1. The Republic of Kazakhstan has sound reason to think that its bid to chair the OSCE in 2009 is well grounded: progress in terms of political reform and social change suggest that it has gone a substantial way to meet OSCE commitments. However, the controversy surrounding its candidacy raises important issues about the OSCE’s ability to promote human rights and democratic values and to fulfil its fundamental aim of contributing the security of Member States.

2. The philosophy of the OSCE has much in common with that of other trans-national organisations and international NGOs that seek to impose universal norms of global governance. Elected politicians play only a passive role in this process and, unlike democratic sovereign states, such NGOs can provide no answers to important questions of political legitimacy and accountability. The OSCE is not directly accountable and in the view of some its decision-making processes lack transparency.

3. Having demonstrated progress in establishing civil society and the rule of law, and in achieving progress in several other areas, Kazakhstan has been led to believe that, providing that the Presidential election of 4th December 2005 represented further progress on the road to democracy it would not be prevented from achieving its goal.

4. However, it is clear that its chances of success in claiming the OSCE’s rotating chairmanship will depend significantly on perceptions of its progress in strengthening democratic institutions which in turn may be heavily influenced by the OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission’s evaluation of the Presidential election. Despite acknowledging a number of improvements, its headline conclusions were largely negative, leading to critical comment in the international media, despite more favourable evaluations by other teams of observers.

5. The conclusion reached by the OSCE/ODIHR Election Observer Mission is in part a reflection of its philosophy and methods. In evaluating elections, the organisation applies a universal standard irrespective of historical factors and wider political realities. Such methods, however, may be a poor guide to what is probably the most important consideration of all: whether or not a country is moving decisively towards democracy.

6. Even judged by its own standards, the OSCE/ODIHR mission was flawed and contained weaknesses resulting from its desire to push its human rights agenda beyond the limits of common sense. There were important inconsistencies between the Preliminary report issued in the immediate aftermath of the election and the Final report issued more than two months later, while the persistent criticism of the Kazakhstan Government’s decision to amend the Elections Law in relation to political demonstrations following the end of election campaigning is based on a questionable interpretation of both the Copenhagen Document and the International Covenant on Human Rights.

7. One way of improving the OSCE/ODIHR’s capacity to evaluate elections might be through the adoption of a system similar to bond ratings which would allow the organisation to “grade” countries on their progress towards democracy. Rather than taking for granted that it possesses a monopoly of wisdom when it comes election observation, the OSCE/ODIHR should be much more willing to debate the respective merits of different approaches and techniques with others possessing knowledge of the subject.

8. The controversy surrounding Kazakhstan’s bid to claim the chairmanship of the OSCE in 2009 will be worthwhile if it leads to an overdue discussion about shortcomings in the structure of the organisation and its ability to contribute to the security of Member States.

9. In particular, the conduct of the OSCE/ODIHR raises important questions about whether democratic values can be promoted by the proactive methods presedntly employed by the OSCE and whether these risk damaging the organisation’s impartiality as an observer.

10. Given the significant improvements in the conduct of the 4th December Presidential elections compared with past efforts, the Kazakhstan Government’s questions about the motives of those presenting the report may be easily understood; it is also good reason to feel that it may be the victim of double standards.

11. Given the West’s continuing dependency on oil and the rising level of Western investment in the Central Asia region, its interests lie in anchoring Kazakhstan as firmly to the West as geo-political factors permit. This task is unlikely to be assisted by rejecting Kazakhstan’s bid to lead the OSCE. Kazakhstan’s success in claiming the chairmanship could accelerate the process of political and economic reform in Kazakhstan while contributing significantly to regional stability.



Gerald Frost
London, May 2006